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Governance Interventions in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries  
Patricia Justino 
 
Summary 
The paper reviews an emerging body of literature on the design and evaluation of current or 
recent governance interventions in countries with ongoing violent conflict, recovering from 
conflict or at serious risk of conflict. The review focuses on three broad intervention areas. 
The first includes interventions that support local governance and the improvement of local 
capacity for collective action. The second area comprises interventions that strengthen the 
accountability, legitimacy and reach of state institutions, including improvements to 
information and the provision of public goods and services. The third centres on 
interventions aimed at changing social rules and norms that shape systems of governance. 
A number of ways forward are proposed for future research and policy interventions on 
governance in conflict-affected countries. These include: the need to better understand the 
political dynamics of conflict-affected countries; the importance of internally driven 
governance reforms; the need to take better account of the distributional consequences of 
governance interventions; and the role of multi-level approaches to governance in countries 
at risk of conflict.  
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1  Introduction 
Strong, capable states with high capacity to govern cannot be assumed. Nation-states 
characterised by wide-reaching bureaucracies started to emerge in Europe only after the 
1500s. Before that, Europe was governed by a myriad of powerful warlords, who fought each 
other almost constantly in a bid to concentrate power and resources. In due course, wealth 
accumulation and new war technologies led to stronger fiscal capacity and the seeds of the 
modern state (Tilly 1992; Besley and Persson 2009; Gennaioli and Voth 2015). But despite 
considerable advances over the past 500 years in how states and societies are governed 
and how political order is sustained, around 1.6 billion people are living in states 
characterised by weak capacity to govern and uphold peace (World Bank 2011; OECD 
2016). These so-called ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ countries are expected to host over half of the 
world’s poor by 2018 (OECD 2014) and over 60 per cent by 2030 (OECD 2016), with the 
number of extremely poor people living in fragile contexts estimated to rise from 480 million 
in 2015 to 542 million by 2035 (OECD 2016). In addition, the number of refugee and 
displaced populations from these countries continues to rise. There are currently 21.3 million 
refugees and 65.3 million internally displaced people in the world – the highest figure since 
the Second World War.1  
 
In recognition of these facts, international donors have committed large amounts of time and 
resources to support durable and inclusive state-building and peace-building initiatives in 
fragile and conflict-affected countries. Given the close association between fragility, violent 
conflict and weak governance, a large part of these funds have been targeted at 
strengthening governance structures and institutions. According to estimates from the OECD 
reported in Mvukiyehe and Samii (2015), 12 per cent of all development aid in 2012 ($127bn 
in total) was spent in governance interventions in fragile and conflict-affected countries. This 
level of commitment may continue in light of the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), with SDG 16 in particular aiming to significantly reduce all forms of violence, 
and work with governments and communities to find lasting institutional solutions to conflict 
and insecurity.  
 
Yet, despite new resource and political commitments, interventions to improve governance 
institutions in fragile and conflict-affected countries have, at best, had mixed results and 
remain uncoordinated (Mansuri and Rao 2012). There is also to date limited rigorous 
knowledge about which governance interventions are most effective (and why) to support 
peace and development in such settings (Blattman and Ralston 2015; Gaarder and Annan 
2013). In addition, for a long time, governments and international agencies alike treated the 
dual goals of ‘good governance’ and ‘conflict resolution’ separately (UNDP 2012). However, 
emerging research and policy on governance interventions in conflict-affected countries has 
started to acknowledge that the two goals are fundamentally interlinked and need to be 
addressed simultaneously (UNDP 2012, 2016a, 2016b; Justino 2016; SDC 2016). This is 
largely because conflict (or the risk of conflict) is unlikely to be solved or prevented without 
states having the capacity to govern without resorting to violence (World Bank 2017).  
 
There is, however, no right answer to determine what forms of governance reduce conflict 
given the serious trade-offs associated with ‘improving governance’ and ‘reducing violence’ 
(UNDP 2016b). While strong and inclusive institutions of governance are central to social 
and political stability in many parts of the world, the pathways to democracy and the rule of 
law are often conflictual and violent. Strong and inclusive governance is typically assumed to 
be a pre-condition for social and political stability. However, and depending on each 
particular context, improving the institutions of governance may generate social and political 
conflict, since changing institutions necessarily affects the balance of power and creates 
                                               
1  www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html.  
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winners and losers that may be at odds with each other (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). At 
the same time, violent conflict is in itself a source of institutional and governance change 
(Justino 2013, 2016; World Bank 2017), which sometimes may result in constructive forms of 
social change and  at other times may lead to vicious cycles of violence, weak governance 
and poverty (Justino 2016). These trade-offs are ever present.  
 
Despite these immense challenges, many have advocated for the need to improve 
governance in conflict-affected contexts as a fundamental way in which the risk of further 
violent conflict can be minimised (see World Bank 2017). The main aim of the paper is to 
review an emerging body of literature on the design and evaluation of current or recent 
governance interventions in fragile and conflict-affected countries. The paper is organised as 
follows. Section 2 reviews important aspects of the relationship between governance, 
fragility and conflict based on recent literature on the role of governance in mitigating the risk 
and consequences of violence and conflict in weak states. Section 3 provides a review of 
existing and ongoing governance interventions in fragile and conflict-affected countries. The 
section outlines areas of governance that recent interventions have addressed, and 
highlights what interventions (and why) have been more or less effective at improving 
governance structures. The review focuses on governance interventions and evaluations 
that have been produced using rigorous methods of counterfactual analysis, such as 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs), other experimental methods and quasi-experimental 
quantitative and qualitative methods using observational data and process tracing methods.2 
Based on this analysis, Section 4 discusses key lessons and proposes a number of ways 
forward for future governance interventions in fragile and conflict-affected countries, which 
take into consideration the particular risks of reforming systems of governance in fragile and 
conflict-affected settings in ways that ensure sustainable state-building and peace 
processes. These include the need to better understand the political dynamics of conflict-
affected countries, the importance of internally driven governance reforms, the need to take 
better account of the distributional consequences of governance interventions, and the role 
of multi-level approaches to governance in countries at risk of conflict. 
 
 
2  Governance, fragility and violent conflict: 
new insights 
This paper focuses on a set of low-income countries with weak state capacity that are 
experiencing ongoing conflict or are at high risk of violent conflict. These encompass 
countries currently affected by armed conflict, but also countries experiencing high levels of 
social and political instability, which may place them at heightened risk of political violence 
outbreaks. These are countries where governments face challenges in providing adequate 
public goods to their populations, including economic and social services, the protection of 
property rights and security, and in gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the populations they 
govern. Some of these countries – for instance, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Haiti and Yemen, 
among others – are affected by extreme political instability and violence, or by persistent 
                                               
2  The review started by selecting key studies included in leading depositories of conflict and governance research: the 
Evidence in Governance and Politics project (E-GAP), the Households in Conflict Network, the Empirical Studies of 
Conflict Project at Princeton University, the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) at MIT, the Innovations for 
Poverty Action project, and 3ie’s Peacebuilding Evidence Gap Map. From these initial references, the review followed a 
snowball approach to identifying further references including in the bibliography of relevant papers until it reached 
saturation. It is important, however, to note that this is not a systematic review of research on governance on conflict-
affected countries but rather a general – albeit comprehensive – review of latest evidence on governance interventions 
in conflict-affected contexts. The review also focuses specifically on studies that have used experimental or quasi-
experimental methodologies. For a review of the large literature on governance challenges in conflict contexts more 
broadly, see Clunan and Trinkunas (2010) and Risse (2011). 
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situations of latent violence. Others, such as Angola, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, among many others, are countries that are governed 
by fairly stable albeit extractive and authoritarian political systems (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012; North, Wallis and Weingast 2009; North et al. 2013), often contested at the margins, 
sometimes violently (Justino 2016). Some of these countries may successfully transition into 
democratic and inclusive societies. Most remain at risk of violent conflict for long periods of 
time because the organisations, relations and power arrangements that underpin their 
governance structures allow – or are not able to resist – the appropriation of institutions and 
resources by some political actors (Justino 2016).  
 
Historically, we have observed three broad ‘types’ of governance systems in countries 
affected by violent conflict.3 The first is characterised by strong, accountable and legitimate 
institutions of governance, such as those that emerged in Western European countries 
following the Second World War (Tilly 1992). North et al. (2009) refer to these as ‘open 
access societies’, while Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) describe these societies as 
governed by ‘inclusive institutions’.  
 
The second ‘type’ – what North et al. (2009, 2013) define as more mature ‘limited order 
societies’ – is characterised by fairly strong governance structures that often result in 
extractive, predatory or authoritarian forms of governance but may be effective in avoiding 
open armed conflict and promoting economic development, sometimes over long periods of 
time. Some of these regimes can be quite stable over long periods, depending on the 
strength of their elite coalitions (Slater 2010). In other cases, central authority may be 
contested at the margins by an array of non-state actors, and governing institutions may 
collapse in face of internal or external economic or political shocks (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012; Tilly 1992; North et al. 2009, 2013). The threat of violence in these settings is high and 
credible when central governments are not able to ensure the monopoly of violence and the 
stability of elite pacts and coalitions (North et al. 2009, 2013; Slater 2010). In fact, violence 
or the threat of violence is, in itself, an integral part of the way in which governance takes 
place in many of these settings (North et al. 2009). Several countries, most with a long 
history of violent conflict in their immediate past, are included in this category – such as 
Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and 
Zimbabwe. Levels of violence and instability vary considerably across these countries, and 
across time, depending on the hold elites have over political power, what bargains and 
arrangements are set in place between the centre and the periphery, and how internal and 
external factors and shocks may affect the power of different social groups (Justino 2016).  
 
The remaining ‘type’ includes transitional and often vulnerable systems of governance that 
take place in countries experiencing protracted forms of violent conflict, and result in vicious 
cycles of state weakness and violent conflict. Examples include the recent return to open 
civil war in South Sudan or the ongoing unstable situations in Somalia, Yemen, the Central 
African Republic and DRC. In these contexts, violent conflict may or may not be overt but 
(the threat of) violence is prevalent and public state-level authority is largely absent. 
Interestingly, in some of these countries, elements of stable governance may emerge at the 
sub-national level in situations when, for instance, alliances between different local political 
actors may result in the relatively efficient provision of security or, less commonly, other 
public goods and services (Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015; Arjona 2014, 2016; Kalyvas 
2006; Mampilly 2011; Raeymaekers 2010; Sanchez de la Sierra 2014a, 2014b; Titeca 2011; 
Titeca and de Herdt 2011). 
 
An important aspect of governance in the second and third ‘types’ discussed above – and 
what distinguishes it from governance in peaceful contexts – is the management of violence 
                                               
3  This typology is developed in Justino (2013) and further extended in Justino (2016). 
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(Justino 2016). Although there is an implicit assumption in policy interventions that conflict 
and peace represent opposite ends of a continuum, this is rarely the case; violent conflict 
and peace tend to coexist in different degrees of intensity in many countries and areas within 
countries, even after the formal end of a conflict (Justino et al. 2013). In fact, violence is 
often a component – rather than a sign of breakdown or collapse – of how governance works 
in fragile and conflict-affected states, shaped by forms of authority, control and competition 
between different social groups and political actors (North et al. 2009, 2013). Managing 
violence as a form of ‘politics as usual’ is a key challenge to governance interventions in 
countries in conflict or at risk of violent conflict. How then does governance take place in 
these settings and what does it look like? 
 
Based on a large literature on social and political order accumulated over several decades 
(Moore 1966; Olson 1993; Tilly 1992), a recent body of research has shown how modern 
democratic societies emerged as governing institutions were able to limit the use of violence 
as a way of maintaining or accessing power, or ruling over territories and populations 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 2012; Besley and Persson 2009; Boix 2003; North et al. 
2009). A unifying idea across this literature is the fact that violence both shapes and is 
shaped – in other words, violence is endogenous – to how institutions of governance emerge 
and are sustained (Justino 2013). This literature offers an appealing framework to 
understand institutional change in fragile and conflict-affected countries characterised by the 
contestation and fragmentation of state authority, and the use of violence as the central way 
in which politics are organised. A limitation of this literature is, however, its focus on the 
historical analysis of the formation of national-level institutions in modern advanced 
democracies. Whether this analysis will help us to better understand how governance 
emerges and is sustained in today’s fragile and conflict-affected countries remains 
debatable.  
 
In an effort to better understand and offer solutions to the institutional and governance 
challenges that face conflict-affected countries, emerging research has started to offer new 
important insights into how political authorities in their various guises behave, compete, 
make decisions and govern in conflict contexts (Arjona et al. 2015; Cramer 2007; Mampilly 
2011; Sanchez de la Sierra 2014a). It also offers insights into how territories and populations 
are ruled and controlled by different political actors (Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007), how 
civilians interact with political authorities and what social forms of differentiation matter in 
those relations (Justino 2009, 2012, 2016; Wood 2008), the role of business interests in 
sustaining or reducing violence (Ahmad 2015), and how alliances are forged or contested 
across time and space (Christia 2012; Justino 2009). This growing body of work has offered 
new insights into how institutions emerge and evolve and how governance happens on the 
ground in conflict-affected countries. These advances have allowed scholars and 
policymakers to ask operational questions and propose practical solutions to governance in 
conflict-affected countries – a literature that will be reviewed in Section 3. This body of 
research emphasises in particular the importance of three key factors that shape 
governance systems in conflict-affected contexts: (a) large variation in how different social 
groups and political elites relate, compete or cooperate; (b) the importance of the local level 
and variation in sub-national political, social and economic institutions; and (c) the relevance 
of informality in how societies, economies and politics are organised. These characteristics 
have formed the basis for the design of recent and ongoing governance interventions that 
will be reviewed in Section 3, as outlined briefly below.  
 
Elites and social groups. Systems of governance are generally understood as resulting 
from arrangements between elites, and a large body of research has described how 
governance in fragile and conflict-affected states is shaped by strong political elites who 
resort to the use of violence to extract benefits for them and the group(s) they represent 
(Reno 1999, 2002; Bates 2008; de Waal 2015). The nature and composition of the elites that 
govern are context- and time-specific and influenced by a myriad of actors with a variety of 
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interests that operate at different geographical levels through formal and informal structures 
and networks. These groups may include ordinary citizens, traditional authorities, religious 
groups and non-state (often armed) groups, among others. Understanding the complex 
relationships between these groups is important because different social groups will shape 
how governance institutions and arrangements are formed, reinforced and change (Justino 
2013), notably through their ability to engage in different forms of contentious politics (Slater 
2010). In other words, different social groups can act to shape the de facto power of political 
elites (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 2012; Slater 2010), while the exclusion of elements of 
these groups from state governance may unsettle political order for a long time (Cederman, 
Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). This may result in open conflict between different social and 
political factions (Slater 2010), or to situations of ‘no peace, no war’ experienced by many 
countries with a history of violent conflict (Richards 2005). 
 
Non-state armed groups are an important group, in their own right and in terms of their 
relations with the state military, local populations and different political elites. The role of 
these groups in shaping governance systems is particularly important when they control 
swathes of territory and sometimes the ‘hearts and minds’ of populations during and after 
conflicts (Justino 2013, 2016). Examples of these actors include rebel groups, militias, 
paramilitary groups, warlords, gangs, mafia, drug trafficking factions, private security 
providers and vigilante groups. Some of these groups may at different times be a part of 
ruling elites; others may always be confined to being rebels opposing ruling factions 
contesting existing governance arrangements, often through violent means (Hagmann and 
Péclard 2011; Hoffmann and Vlassenroot 2014; Luckham and Kirk 2013). 
 
Ordinary citizens are another group that may profoundly shape governance structures in 
conflict-affected countries. Notably, the way in which the views of different citizens across 
different identities are incorporated into governance systems (the social contract) is 
important because it determines how citizens perceive the balance of power between 
themselves and those that govern them (Justino 2016). The form and perceived 
effectiveness of this ‘social contract’ in turn will shape their (cooperative, violent or resistant) 
behaviour towards political elites and other citizens (Gáfaro, Ibáñez and Justino 2014). This 
is because civilians are not just victims and can exercise considerable agency in violent 
contexts through the ways in which they navigate, mitigate, resist, create alliances and 
manage conflict in the midst of seeming disorder (Justino 2013). These forms of civilian 
agency, in turn, may either destabilise political pacts or offer entry points for the 
implementation of successful conflict resolution mechanisms. 
 
Other actors such as traditional leaders outside ruling elite pacts, religious organisations and 
other civic organisations may also affect governance systems through their influence on the 
composition of elites and their own leadership roles, their alliances with local populations, 
their influence in how local social groups are mobilised and their relationship with and 
influence over external actors (such as aid donors and the international community as a 
whole) – what Slater (2010) describes as ‘symbolic power’. In some cases, these relations 
may work to the detriment of local populations. In other cases, state and non-state actors 
effectively function together in the co-provisioning of services and security (Ananth Pur and 
Moore 2009; Joshi and Moore 2004; Mampilly 2011; Cederman, Min and Winner 2010), 
including forms of conflict mediation and local security (Arjona 2016; Mampilly 2011).  
 
Recognition of these complex relationships between different social groups in fragile and 
conflict-affected countries has generated a variety of governance interventions that have 
attempted to strengthen the capacity of local communities for collective action (through the 
popular Community Driven Development (CDD) programmes supported by the World Bank) 
or the role of traditional authorities. These interventions have generated a mix of 
development and stability outcomes that will be discussed further in Section 3. 
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The local level. Governance takes place at different levels: from individuals, households 
and communities (the micro/local level) to the national and international levels (Balcells and 
Justino 2014). The current literature on governance and economic development has largely 
focused on macro-level historical processes of state formation, and on the security of states 
and the capacity of states to provide services and public goods, and to maintain the rule of 
law.4 However, states may themselves be directly or indirectly responsible for violence and 
for predatory and repressive behaviours that perpetuate violence. Therefore, ensuring the 
security of states may often be at odds with ensuring the security of citizens, and 
governance interventions aimed at improving the capacity of states to govern may (often 
inadvertently) reinforce ways of governance detrimental to the economic and physical 
security of those that are governed (Autesserre 2010; Mampilly 2011).  
 
In addition, governance systems have important micro-level foundations grounded on how 
societies and economies are organised, ruled and governed locally (Balcells and Justino 
2014; Pande and Udry 2005; Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud 2008). These are particularly 
central to understanding contexts of weak state capacity where public authority is contested 
and fragmented (Justino 2012, 2013). Notably, local political dynamics under situations of 
fragmented state-level authority may not always aggregate to coherent national-level 
outcomes. For instance, several studies have documented the emergence and persistence 
of pockets of peace and stability even amidst the worst forms of armed conflict (Nordstrom 
1997; Mampilly 2011), as well as the fact that local (and not just state-level) institutional 
structures influence political processes during and after conflicts (Justino 2012; Justino, 
Brück and Verwimp 2013; Kalyvas 2006). This local perspective is important because 
policies that work in one region may not work in another region in the same country, since 
multiple conflicts and forms of governance can occur within the same state with limited 
geographical overlap. As a result, many governance interventions being implemented in 
conflict-affected countries have adopted a strong sub-national focus. Many have had positive 
results, while others have raised important challenges, as will be discussed in Section 3. 
 
Formal and informal institutions. Governance systems are shaped by institutions – ‘the 
rules of the game in a society’ (North 1990: 3) – that are created and changed at different 
moments in time. These can be formal rules and organisations, but can also be informal, 
illegal and sometimes violent – the type of institutions that characterise how governance 
structures operate in fragile and conflict-affected countries. An influential body of literature 
has long questioned the centrality of formal state institutions in local systems of governance 
in areas of uneven or absent state presence (Batley 2011;Joshi and Moore 2004; Scott 
1999, 2009; Unsworth 2010). In conflict-affected countries, where public authority is at best 
weak and fragmented, institutions are shaped by how political power is distributed across 
different parts of the territory and the social groups that inhabit them. In these settings, there 
is an important distinction to be made between de jure political power, whose allocation is 
determined by legitimate and representative institutions (such as through voting), and de 
facto political power, which is held by different political actors as a result of the use or the 
threat of force, or the ability to engage powerful systems of patronage and clientelism 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Recent governance interventions in conflict-affected 
settings have attempted to support state governance by strengthening its de jure political 
power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 2012). Popular interventions have included the 
reform of electoral systems, the formalisation of property rights, strengthening systems of 
revenue allocation, and improvements in the provision of public goods and services. Other 
interventions (such as forms of participatory development) have attempted to encourage 
changes in the distribution of the de facto political power in ways that result in more inclusive 
institutions. These are also discussed in more detail in Section 3. 
                                               
4  See, for instance, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), and review in Blattman and Miguel (2010).  
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3  Governance interventions in conflict-
affected settings 
The most up-to-date review of policy interventions in conflict-affected countries (Brown et al. 
2015) identifies ‘public sector governance capacity building and reform’ as a key area where 
we have very limited evidence on what works (see also Cameron et al. 2015). A recent 
policy report on the role of governance in fragile and conflict-affected contexts concludes in 
addition that ‘the potential of local governance for peacebuilding, state-building and recovery 
often remains neglected’ (UNDP 2016b: 15; see also Hughes, Öjendal and Schierenbeck 
2015). However, several international institutions, governments and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) have argued for the need to intervene and implement governance 
structures that prevent violent conflicts and reduce the risk of violence (UNDP 2016b; World 
Bank 2011, 2017).  
 
Some progress has been made with a number of recent and ongoing interventions 
attempting to address key aspects of governance in countries with ongoing violent conflict, 
recovering from conflict or at serious risk of conflict. These interventions have largely 
focused on the following areas: (a) local governance, decentralisation, and improving local 
capacity for collective action; (b) strengthening accountability, legitimacy and reach of state 
institutions, including improving information and the provision of public goods and services; 
and (c) interventions aimed at changing rules and norms that shape systems of governance, 
including informal relations and institutions. This literature is reviewed in this section. As 
already noted, the review focuses on governance interventions that have been rigorously 
evaluated using counterfactual qualitative or quantitative analysis. This focus necessarily 
means that some past or ongoing governance interventions where only descriptive 
information is available may not be part of the review. However, the learning potential from 
rigorous evaluations allows us to concentrate on identifying what aspects of governance 
interventions may or may not work (and why) in countries experiencing violent conflict or at 
risk of conflict.  
 
3.1 The local level, decentralisation and collective action 
This is probably the area where most recent governance interventions have taken place. 
These interventions, in general terms, have been built on the premise, discussed in the 
previous section, that authority in conflict-affected countries is fragmented. Therefore, strong 
state institutional capacity – commonly heralded as a necessary condition for successful 
governance – may not always be present in these contexts. As a result, collective action and 
coordination across different socioeconomic groups may have an important role to play in 
these contexts (Bardhan 2005; North 1990; Ostrom 1990; Putnam 1993), where local 
community organisations may develop efficient informal institutions because information is 
more easily transmitted among local networks, and social norms are more easily enforced 
(Ostrom 1990).  
 
As a result, large amounts of international aid have been transferred to post-conflict 
countries through Community Driven Development (CDD) programmes. These programmes 
have, for the most part, been promoted by the World Bank (with funding of around £2bn per 
year) but the idea of supporting better governance through bottom-up approaches and 
decentralisation of governance institutions is pervasive across most international donors 
(see UNDP 2016b).  
 
The aim of CDD programmes is largely to support the establishment of local institutions to 
promote participatory governance and more transparent and accountable decision-making 
processes (Pritchett and Woolcock 2003). In general (even though there is some variation 
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within donor programmes), CDD programmes involve the creation of community councils 
that decide on a series of local development plans and funding allocations based on 
participatory and transparent decision-making processes involving the whole community. 
The underlying assumption is that communities will ‘learn’ about participatory democracy 
and accountable governance in ways that will outlast the programme (King and Samii 2014).  
 
These programmes in effect support a larger agenda of greater political and institutional 
decentralisation in conflict-affected countries as a way of: (1) improving the administration 
and delivery of public goods and services in contexts where central governments are weak 
and ineffective; (2) establishing local participation and autonomy in decision-making 
processes by involving whole communities and social groups in participatory processes of 
decision-making and resource allocation; and (3) redistributing power, supporting local 
power-sharing and appeasing local ethnic or religious tensions and divisions. As a result, 
each of these programmes is effectively ‘a democracy project disguised as – or at least as 
well as – a development project’ (Barron, Diprose and Woolcock 2011: 4). Two key 
objectives of these interventions are, therefore, to strengthen local social cohesion in ways 
that promote inclusive forms of local governance (that eventually will scale up to better 
governance institutions nationally), and to broaden the political representation and power-
sharing of marginalised groups in governance systems. 
 
3.1.1 Strengthening social cohesion and community-level governance  
There is limited agreement in the literature about which policy reforms will lead to legitimate 
and more accountable forms of governance in conflict-affected countries. However, there is 
a strong sense – discussed in Section 2 – that local initiatives which take into account the 
myriad interests and power structures that emerge at the sub-national level and their 
informal nature may yield positive outcomes. These assumptions have supported a number 
of interventions to strengthen the capacity of local communities for collective action and 
governance, and the role of informal and traditional authorities in processes of decentralised 
political decision-making. The results of these governance interventions in how institutions in 
conflict-affected countries govern, uphold the rule of law, and manage conflict and violence 
have been mixed.  
 
Some of these large CDD programmes have been subject to meticulous impact evaluation, 
often embedded at the design stage of the programme. In one of the first studies of this kind, 
Fearon, Humphreys and Weinsten (2009) used a randomised field experiment to evaluate 
the impact of a community-driven reconstruction programme in northern Liberia. The 
programme aimed to establish democratic, community-level institutions to implement 
decisions about local public goods using a participatory approach. The study assessed 
whether and how the introduction of these new institutions has affected patterns of social 
cooperation. The authors found that the programme improved community cooperation in a 
way that persisted after the end of the programme due to increases in coordination among 
community members.  
 
Subsequent evaluations of similar CDD programmes have been less positive. Casey, 
Glennerster and Miguel (2012) evaluated an attempt to reform local governance institutions 
in Sierra Leone by exploiting a randomly assigned governance intervention as part of the 
‘GoBifo’ CDD programme. The objectives of the intervention were to increase local 
coordination by setting up village development committees, and to enhance the participation 
of young people and women in leadership positions. Sierra Leone is a relevant country for 
this purpose because elite co-option and predatory behaviour were considered to be key 
drivers of the civil war that started in 1991 and of slow development progress in the country 
before and since (Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson 2014). The results of the study showed 
that the intervention was successful in setting up new village structures, in improving local 
public goods and in enhancing economic welfare. However, the study did not find evidence 
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of persistent changes in village institutions, local collective action capacity, social norms and 
attitudes or the nature of de facto political power.  
 
Using similar experimental methodologies, Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2012) evaluated 
the large-scale National Solidarity Program (NSP) in Afghanistan. The study reported that 
food distribution systems through traditional or elected local elites did not result in 
improvements in effectiveness but led to less appropriation by elected elites. The authors 
also found a positive effect of the NSP on attitudes towards government and levels of 
security, but only in areas with lower initial levels of violence, leading the authors to conclude 
that ‘a certain minimum threshold of security has to be in place for the provision of goods 
and services to have an effect on improving attitudes towards the government and reducing 
violence’” (see also Beath et al. 2013a).  
 
Humphreys, Sanchez de la Sierra and Van der Windt (2014) evaluated the impact of the 
community-driven reconstruction ‘Tuungane’ programme implemented in the DRC, which 
sought to alter attitudes towards democratic practices and local decision-making. As with 
other CDD interventions, the programme provided training in leadership, good governance 
and social inclusion to local communities. Afterwards, an elected committee worked 
alongside other community members to select and implement a number of infrastructure 
development projects. The evaluation study showed that the programme did not have 
significant effects on intended outcomes, including participation, accountability, efficiency 
transparency and capture, in treated communities. Similar results have been reported in the 
evaluation of a comparable recent programme implemented between 2006 and 2011 in 
Sudan (Avdeenko and Gilligan 2014). 
 
The studies discussed above have focused on the effects of CDD programmes on key areas 
of local governance, including inclusive participation, social cohesion, collective action and 
accountability. More recently, some studies have evaluated CDD programmes and the 
institutions of governance they create in terms of their effects on violence and conflict 
outcomes. This literature is still in its infancy but it has generated unexpected results. Crost, 
Felter and Johnston (2014) evaluated a large-scale CDD programme in the Philippines, 
which aimed to enhance local infrastructure, governance, participation and social cohesion. 
They found that the programme exacerbated the conflict when insurgents were able to 
sabotage the programmes for political gain. In contrast, Barron et al. (2011) found that the 
Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia, in areas where it was well-implemented and 
rules followed, improved village-level conflict resolution structures but did not necessarily 
affect forms of violent conflict external to the programme.  
 
These results are in line with recent findings on the impact of various forms of international 
aid on violent conflict. Although an earlier study found that humanitarian aid was effective in 
reducing the occurrence of violent conflict (Ree and Nillesen 2009), two recent studies have 
reported the opposite result. Nunn and Qian (2014) show that food aid increased the 
incidence of civil conflicts in a panel of 125 non-OECD countries in the period between 1971 
and 2006, while Dube and Naidu (2010) report a negative effect of US military aid on political 
conflict in Colombia. Similarly to the CDD findings above, in both studies, the results are 
explained by the ability of armed factions and opposition groups to appropriate aid and use it 
for their own strategic objectives – an issue that will be addressed in more detail in Section 4. 
 
Another area of local governance intervention has been to support the role of traditional 
authorities. Local chiefs have taken prominence in recent studies (Acemoglu et al. 2014; 
Baldwin and Mvukiyehe 2011; Meriggi and Bulte 2015; Turley et al. 2016). The main idea is 
that, in countries where the majority of population live in rural areas, and where the national 
state lacks the capacity and the power to penetrate society, traditional institutions of local 
governance may be more efficient in shaping development outcomes. Decentralising 
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decision-making in these settings may therefore yield potential development benefits for 
local populations. However, very few of these interventions have been evaluated rigorously 
and often it is not clear what outcomes the programme intends to address.  
 
In one of the few available empirical analyses on the role of traditional authorities in conflict-
affected countries, Acemoglu et al. (2014) discuss the interesting result that communities in 
Sierra Leone, where the power of chiefs was stronger (and less constraint by local elites), 
exhibited greater social capital (attendance at community meetings, participation in social 
groups and the undertaking of collective actions). This finding arises because more 
dominant elites generally shape civil society and institutions of civic participation in their 
villages for their own benefit and continued dominance. Chiefs that face fewer constraints 
from these local elites build social capital as a way to control or monitor society, with 
resulting welfare benefits for their community members. A complementary result is reported 
in Turley et al. (2016), who compared the quality of management of a local development 
project (assigned through a CDD programme), also in Sierra Leone, when it was overseen 
by local elites or by a committee of villagers. The study showed that local elites/chiefs were 
not more likely to divert funds from the project than villagers. Chiefs were more likely to 
better manage the projects (including their timely start and completion) and to ensure more 
benefits to the community – most likely due to their wider social connectivity within the 
community. Baldwin and Mvukiyehe (2011) analysed a particular situation in post-conflict 
Liberia where, after 2002, local chiefs became appointed through participatory processes 
whereby they were selected by their communities; (before 2002 chiefs could either be 
selected by participatory processes or appointed by higher-level authorities). The study 
found that participatory approaches to the appointment of chiefs resulted in higher levels of 
community consultation by chiefs and civic participation, even though it led to lower 
community contributions towards local public goods.  
 
3.1.2 Broadening the representation of marginalised groups and improving 
inclusiveness 
A growing literature has analysed the role of the political power of minorities on various 
outcomes, such as crime, policymaking and pro-social attitudes, under the implicit 
assumption that improving inclusiveness and local power-sharing among different social 
groups will generate stronger forms of governance accountability and legitimacy and reduce 
the risk of violence between groups. Most of the evidence to date comes from India where, 
in 1993, the government mandated the establishment of political representation quotas for 
women and other marginalised groups at various levels in local government. A number of 
studies have found significant positive effects of female leaders on various community-level 
welfare outcomes (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2011), on 
improved attitudes towards women leaders (Beaman et al. 2009) and on higher aspirations 
and educational attainment of girls (Beaman et al. 2011). Similarly, increased representation 
of disadvantaged castes in political office has been found to bring greater benefits for these 
castes (Pande 2003). Iyer et al. (2012) report, in addition, that political representation is an 
important means of improving the reporting of crime against women.  
 
Replicating these findings in conflict contexts has been limited, and the evidence on the 
effectiveness of community-level governance reforms to improve inclusiveness, power-
sharing and the welfare of marginalised groups in conflict-affected countries is mixed. Casey 
et al. (2012), discussed above, evaluated one such attempt in the form of a CDD programme 
implemented in Sierra Leone. Part of the aim of this intervention was to improve the 
participation of youth and women in leadership positions in newly created village councils. 
The study found no evidence that the programme empowered minorities, improved collective 
action or increased female representation in local decision-making over the longer term. A 
possible explanation may lie in the fact that communities may have been pushed towards 
more inclusion without actually challenging the elites who hold the de facto power, as 
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discussed in Section 2. This is in contrast with the examples from India, which specifically 
focused on promoting effective changes in de jure power (such as the introduction of female 
leadership quotas), with more effective welfare outcomes among minorities.  
 
A more positive result is reported in Beath et al. (2013b), also discussed above, who 
conducted a randomised field experiment to examine the effect of the NSP in Afghanistan. 
The programme included a mandate to increase female political participation by prescribing 
the creation of local councils with equal representation of men and women through secret 
ballot voting. The study found that the programme, similarly to the interventions in India, 
increased female participation in village governance, community life and economic activity, 
and increased female village-level decision-making. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that assigning minorities formal designated roles in decision-making and political processes 
(as discussed in Beath et al. 2013b) may produce stronger effect than interventions that 
merely encourage (through training or education campaigns, for instance) the participation of 
minorities more generally (as reported in Casey et al. 2012).  
 
3.2 Accountability, legitimacy and the reach of state institutions 
One way of improving governance interventions in weak states at risk of conflict and 
violence is to strengthen the role of state institutions. Existing research has shown that 
accountability and legitimacy of state institutions are key determinants of economic 
performance and political stability (Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Paris 2004). The role of the state 
has traditionally been viewed as central to institution-building processes because central 
states may be better able to enforce contracts, the rule of law and property rights than local 
political authorities (Besley 1995). But the centralisation of public authority depends on how 
governments are able to credibly commit to non-predatory behaviour and the upholding of 
the social contract (North and Weingast 1989; Goodwin 2001; Olken 2007). This, in turn, 
requires a series of checks and balances that shape how governing institutions function, 
when and how rules are not overcome by the interests of powerful elites, and how the risk of 
violence at different stages of the process of governance is managed by governments.  
 
State elites may not engage in predatory behaviour and may support governance reforms 
when the political costs of doing so (i.e. the potential loss of future political power) are low, or 
the political costs of not reforming (for instance, not being elected) are high (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006; Bardhan 2005; North et al. 2009). Based on these key theoretical premises, 
a series of studies have proposed and evaluated a number of recent governance 
interventions aimed at strengthening the functioning of weak democratic institutions through 
information campaigns, and through wider and more inclusive provision of public goods and 
services. These two areas of intervention are reviewed below.  
 
3.2.1 Reducing information constraints in weak democracies  
Electoral institutions – a cornerstone of ‘good governance’ agendas – sometimes fail to 
improve governance and accountability partly because voters lack information about the 
actions of politicians and about their behaviour and preferences (Besley and Burgess 2002). 
As a result, in recent years, a number of interventions have been designed and implemented 
to investigate whether providing information to citizens about politicians will have an effect 
on turnout, voter choice and, eventually, how elected politicians perform. The first generation 
of these interventions was implemented in contexts of weak governance that were largely 
peaceful (India, Mexico and Brazil). More recent interventions have focused on conflict-
affected countries.  
 
Banerjee et al. (2011) implemented a randomised experiment aimed at providing mass 
information through newspapers about the achievements and shortcomings of politicians 
standing for election in India. The aim of the study was to assess whether this type of 
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information influenced voter turnout. They found that the information led to higher turnout in 
areas that received the information, reduced vote-buying, and led to higher vote share for 
better-performing and more-qualified incumbents. In a related study in Mexico, Chong et al. 
(2011) examined whether providing information to voters about political corruption influenced 
their participation in elections and their support for the opposition. To that purpose, the study 
developed a randomised experiment at the municipality level in which households received 
different information about corruption and public spending in the lead-up to the 2009 
Mexican elections. Access to this information led to reduced votes for the incumbent, lower 
voter turnout and more votes for the opposition. Contrary to the case of India, in Mexico, 
voters seemed to have responded to the provision of information by withdrawing from the 
political process. In a similar study, de Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara (2013) found that 
information about corruption among politicians in Brazil also led to reduced voter turnout. 
 
Despite these mixed results in peaceful settings, the idea that information on political 
candidates and voter education campaigns may shape voting outcomes – and therefore the 
accountability and legitimacy of those that govern – has taken off as a form of improving 
governance in fragile and conflict-affected countries. As above, these interventions are 
based on the implicit assumption that citizens in weak states may lack information on 
politicians’ performance, which restricts their ability to decide on whether to reward or 
sanction incumbents in elections. Gine and Mansuri (2012) conducted a field experiment in 
Pakistan to examine the impact of pre-election voter information campaigns on voter 
participation, particularly among women. The evaluation of the intervention found that 
women targeted by the information campaign were more likely to vote, discuss political 
issues, and value the importance of voting. Similarly, Bidwell, Casey and Glennerster (2015) 
provided voters with information on campaign platforms during the 2012 parliamentary 
elections in post-conflict Sierra Leone by filming and disseminating debates between 
candidates using mobile cinemas. The study reported an increase in political knowledge, 
political alignment and voting percentages in areas where the debates where shown. 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2012) implemented a similar experiment in Uganda in which 
voters were provided with information about politicians’ behaviour and incumbents’ 
performance. The study evaluated the impact of greater transparency on voters’ attitudes, 
the performance of politicians and on electoral outcomes. However, and similarly to the 
above-mentioned studies on Mexico and Brazil, the authors did not find evidence that 
increased transparency about political performance improves democratic accountability.  
 
A study by Collier and Vicente (2014) analysed the effect of similar information campaigns 
on violence. The study started from the premise that recent pressures to run elections in 
societies with weak governance may cause an increase in violence as different factions fight 
for popular support – possibly because, as theorised in North et al. (2009), violence is part of 
how these societies are governed. The authors conducted a field experiment in Nigeria to 
establish the effect of community-based anti-violence information campaigns conducted 
before the 2007 elections. The results show that such campaigns led to an increased sense 
of security among individuals targeted by the campaign and to increases in voter turnout. In 
another related study, Vicente (2014) found that voter education campaigns against vote-
buying in São Tomé and Príncipe reduced corruption during the 2006 presidential elections. 
The results of the study showed that providing voters with more information about key areas 
of incumbent performance may instil a civic culture, with positive effects on their political 
behaviour and, ultimately, on accountability. More recently, Mvukiyehe and Samii (2015) 
analysed the effect of a democracy project in Liberia to improve voters’ access to 
information, voter coordination and voter security. The project randomly assigned different 
communities across Liberia to a combination of monthly civil education activities and a 
security committee programme that linked communities to the United Nations peacekeeping 
mission. The results showed a positive effect of the education programme on civic 
participation, increased sensitivity to voter intimidation and stronger preferences for national 
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rather than local political candidates involved in local patronage systems. The security 
programme had negligible effects on these outcomes.  
 
3.2.2 Strengthening public goods provision 
The support of livelihoods and the provision of public goods and services are indicators of an 
operational ‘social contract’ (Bates 1983; Olson 1993) – arguably an important component of 
stability and peace. But they may not automatically correlate to equal distribution of goods 
and services across regions or groups. In fact, some social groups and individuals may 
benefit from the political alliances and relations that emerge during conflicts, while others are 
left out for reasons related to the specific configurations of different governance 
arrangements.  
 
A large body of literature has recently argued that one way of strengthening accountability, 
legitimacy and the reach of state institutions would be through the better provision of security 
and public goods and services (Pande and Udry 2005). Empirical analyses of these effects 
in largely peaceful settings have, however, generated mixed findings. Manacorda, Miguel 
and Vigorito (2011) found that the Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social 
(PANES) cash transfer programme implemented in Uruguay between 2005 and 2007 led to 
improved support of the incumbent government among programme beneficiaries. Similar 
results are reported in Baez et al. (2012) for the Familias en Acción programme in Colombia, 
and Zucco (2013) for the conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes in Brazil. In contrast, 
Linos (2013) found that a small cash transfer programme implemented in Honduras between 
2000 and 2005 resulted in increases in the re-election probabilities of local mayors, but had 
no effect on presidential election outcomes. De La O (2013) shows that the Oportunidades 
programme in Mexico increased both voter turnout in the 2000 presidential election and the 
incumbent’s share of the votes. However, using different model specifications, Imai, King 
and Velasco Rivera (2016) report that the same programme did not have an effect on the 
voter turnout or on electoral support for the incumbent party in the same elections. Justino 
and Martorano (2016b) show that increases in the coverage of the same programme during 
the 2008 financial crisis resulted in larger individual participation in the 2010 presidential 
elections in Mexico and in higher individual propensity to vote, particularly for the incumbent 
party. 
 
Despite these mixed results, CCT programmes have become a popular form of intervention 
to strengthen the legitimacy of state governing institutions (see, for instance, World Bank 
2009), including in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (UNHCR 2012). But regardless of 
such claims, very few programmes to date have been evaluated in terms of their effects on 
governance outcomes. There are a few exceptions: two initial studies focused on estimating 
the effect of cash transfer programmes on social cohesion and violent attitudes. The first 
was the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) and Youth Opportunities Program, 
implemented by Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) (Blattman, Fiala and Martinez 2014). 
This programme provided cash transfers ($7,100) to groups of young adults (aged 16–35) to 
be used in skills training and self-employment trades. The evaluation of the programme 
found evidence for a modest increase in social cohesion – arguably a key factor in improving 
the strength of governance institutions – as a result of the programme. The second study, by 
Blattman, Jamison and Sheridan (2017), found that cash interventions aimed at improving 
self-control and fostering positive aspirations among criminally engaged young men in 
Liberia reduced acts of crime and violence by 20–50 per cent. These are interesting 
examples of interventions that are not directly aimed at improving governance but rather at 
promoting forms of constructive citizenship that may yield future benefits in terms of stronger 
governance performance and reducing the risks of reigniting violence. A related body of 
literature has also shown evidence for a causal effect of cash transfer programmes on crime 
reduction (Chioda, de Mello and Soares 2012; Camacho and Mejía 2014). 
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To the best of my knowledge, the only study to date that has evaluated the effect of a cash 
transfer programme on violent conflict is that of Crost, Felter and Johnston (2016). The study 
analysed the effects of a CCT programme implemented in the Philippines and reported a 
reduction in violent events during the first nine months in villages where the programme was 
implemented (in relation to control villages, where the programme was not implemented), as 
well as a reduction in the levels of control exercised by insurgent groups.  
 
A growing literature has examined the effects of government welfare spending on political 
violence beyond cash transfer programmes. These studies show, in general, a positive 
correlation between government social expenditures and the incidence of armed conflict 
(Taydas and Peksen 2012; Thyne 2006).5 Justino (2015) provides causal evidence that 
government expenditure on social services contributed to the reduction of rioting in India 
using state-level data over the period between 1960 and 2011, while Justino and Martorano 
(2016a) showed a similar effect of government welfare expenditure on the incidence of 
armed conflict across Latin America between 1970 and 2010. Berman, Shapiro and Felter 
(2011) found that spending by the US army on local public goods in Iraq led to reductions in 
violence due to increased support for the government and rises in the opportunity costs of 
individuals that benefited from the payments joining insurgent groups. Iyengar, Monten and 
Hanson (2011) add to these findings that the same funding by the US army in Iraq, when 
used on labour-intensive projects, had the effect of substantially reducing violence. The 
study argues this is because legal labour markets may provide an alternative to insurgent 
activity. This is in line with Khanna and Zimmermann (2014), who analyse the effect of the 
large-scale Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) on the 
incidence of Maoist violence across the country. The scheme provides 100 days of 
guaranteed public sector employment at the minimum wage to all rural households willing to 
work. One of its aims was to reduce the support of rural populations for the Maoist 
insurgency that has spread through India in recent years. The study finds that the NREGS 
led to civilians providing more information to the state, which has improved the efficiency of 
the police against the insurgents.  
 
The positive effects of government social policies are not limited to welfare transfers. Cerdá 
et al. (2012) report the effects on violence of the now notorious cable car system and 
associated infrastructure investments conducted by the mayor’s office in Medellín, Colombia. 
The idea was to improve the quality of infrastructure in poorer areas in Medellín and improve 
their links with the city’s urban centre in an effort to improve living conditions and reduce 
crime and violence. The results of this government-led infrastructure and public good 
provision included a 66 per cent reduction in homicides in neighbourhoods that benefited 
from the investment, and a 75 per cent reduction in reports of violence in the same areas. 
Similarly, de Juan and Bank (2015) have shown that the risk of violence in the recent conflict 
in Syria between March 2011 and November 2012 was lower in sub-districts where there 
was greater government provision of electricity.  
 
A final area of governance interventions aimed at strengthening state capacity has 
incorporated a series of programmes under the banner of ‘security sector reform’. Such 
interventions aim to improve the state provision of security and the rule of law, as well as 
trust in and reach of state institutions, given that the police and courts are usually some of 
the common ways in which citizens relate to the state (O’Donnell 2004). A large literature 
has focused on the importance of security sector reform in conflict-affected countries, with 
mixed results (see, for instance, DFID 2007). This literature is largely descriptive but, 
recently, more rigorous studies have started to emerge. Some interventions have, 
understandably, focused on the role of ex-combatants and their integration into civilian life 
given the highly debated perceived or real threat such individuals may pose to security (see 
Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik 2015). Two key studies in this area are Humphreys and 
                                               
5  This literature is reviewed in Justino and Martorano (2016a). 
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Weinstein (2007) and Gilligan, Mvukiyehe and Samii (2013), both showing less than positive 
effects of ex-combatant reintegration programmes. The study by Humphreys and Weinstein 
(2007) analysed the results of a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) 
intervention conducted in Sierra Leone. The study found limited evidence that the 
programme facilitated reintegration of combatants into civilian life, particularly among those 
exposed to more abusive military factions and among the wealthier and more educated     
ex-combatants, who tend to retain social links to their former military factions. Gilligan et al. 
(2013) evaluated a similar DDR programme implemented in Burundi. The results showed a 
20–35 per cent reduction in poverty and improved livelihoods among ex-combatants who 
benefited from the programme, but no effect on their attitudes towards the peace process or 
the government. 
 
Other security interventions have aimed more directly at improving state capacity and state-
citizen relations by strengthening trust in the state police and the justice and security sectors 
through improved policing at the community level and education campaigns to increase 
awareness about the rule of law and justice and security interventions. The notorious 
Pacifying Police Units introduced to reduce crime in Brazilian favelas are one of such 
examples (Magaloni, Franco and Melo 2015). Examples from conflict-affected countries are 
still rare. One recent study conducted by Blair, Karim and Morse (2016) evaluated the 
Liberian National Police ‘Confidence Patrol’ community policing programme. As with other 
similar interventions, the main aim of the programme was to build trust in the state police in 
post-conflict Liberia and raise community awareness about wider reforms in the justice and 
security sectors. The study reports increased knowledge about the police and about access 
to justice among communities where the programme was implemented (compared to control 
communities), as well as increased security in property rights, lower incidence of crimes 
(assault and domestic violence) and rises in reporting of crimes to the police. The 
programme did not, however, seem to affect trust in the police, largely due to very high 
expectations placed on the new police unit. This may, however, change over the long term 
as the programme matures. 
 
The studies reviewed in this section seem to strongly suggest that strengthening state 
capacity – notably, in terms of improved public goods and security provision – may have 
positive effects on reducing conflict and the risk of violence. These interventions come 
naturally at a cost for public finances. However, while there has been a rise in research on 
the role of public good provision in conflict contexts, much less has been done to understand 
the reform of public revenues – taxation, in particular – in conflict-affected contexts or 
countries at risk of violence. Taxation is, however, a central element of how states are built, 
shaping their capacity to provide public goods and services and increasing the reach of their 
institutions and bureaucracies (Brautigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 2008; Levi 1988; Tilly 1992). 
The role of taxation in processes of state-building in conflict-affected countries has only 
begun to be explored (Justino 2016). Examples include the study by Jibao and Prichard 
(2016) of a property tax reform in the aftermath of the conflict in Sierra Leone, which shows 
evidence for the successful implementation of the reform programme thanks to effective 
local partnerships, enhanced local capacity for revenue collection and improved 
transparency. Another example is the analysis conducted by Mascagni, Nell and Monkam 
(2016) of an intervention aimed at improving tax compliance in Rwanda, which shows that 
methods that improve awareness about taxes increase compliance. These two studies 
reflect on the importance of improved tax systems in two post-conflict countries. However, 
no study to date has yet considered how systems of taxation may be used in state-building 
processes in post-conflict countries (Justino 2016), despite historical evidence about the 
importance of such processes elsewhere (Tilly 1992). One exception is the ongoing work of 
Paler, Prichard, Sanchez de la Sierra and Samii on formal and informal taxation in the DRC.6 
Results of this research are, however, not yet available. 
                                               
6  See their pre-analysis plan here: http://egap.org/registration/1993.  
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3.3 Social rules and norms 
One interesting angle in recent research on governance and institutions in developing 
countries has been the role of non-state institutional coordination – such as through family 
values, culture and beliefs – which has been shown to profoundly shape economic and 
political outcomes in the long term (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2010; Aldashev and Platteau 
2014; Alesina and Giuliano 2013; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2006; Tabellini 2008; 
Platteau 2000; Platteau and Peccoud 2010). Because norms and beliefs are endogenous to 
development processes (Bowles 2003), governance reforms may be able to affect them in 
ways that may strengthen the institutional capacity of weak states to govern and to support 
sustainable development and peace. Interesting emerging areas of research have been the 
use of the media as a tool for institutional change and accountability (Besley and Prat 2006; 
La Ferrara, Chong and Duryea 2012), as well as research on the role of informal institutions 
in countries with weak state capacity (Ostrom 1990; Putnam 1993).  
 
Another promising area is related to a better understanding of the social norms, attitudes, 
traditions, culture, beliefs and morals that may shape more formal governance institutions or 
constrain the establishment of such institutions (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Jakiela 2011; 
North 1990). For instance, recent research has shown that, although in many cases armed 
conflict may destroy communities and social relations, individual exposure to violence may 
result in positive collective engagement and cooperation (Bellows and Miguel 2009; 
Blattman 2009; Schaub 2014; Voors et al. 2012).7 Strong community cooperation has, 
however, at times also created the conditions for the outbreak or renewal of violence 
(Petersen 2001; Wood 2003). But understanding pro-social (as well as less cooperative) 
norms, beliefs and behaviours, and how they change, is fundamental to understanding how 
the interaction between formal and informal institutions of governance can be harnessed to 
deliver desirable policy goals.  
 
This literature on the links between institutions, norms and governance outcomes is small 
but has yielded initial positive results. Jakiela (2011) discusses how experimental economics 
methods can be used to better understand the mechanisms that shape informal institutions. 
The most promising are those experiments designed to measure altruism and reciprocity, 
social cooperation, and how non-cooperative behaviour is (or is not) punished. Dal Bó, 
Foster and Putterman (2010) suggest ways in which democratic institutions may affect 
cooperative behaviour. Using a series of lab-based behavioural experiments, they find that 
the effect of policies on levels of social cooperation are greater when they are chosen 
democratically by citizens rather than when they are externally imposed. This finding 
suggests that governance reforms may be most effective when they promote pro-social 
norms and behaviours.  
 
Some of these lessons have been applied (in a very small but growing literature) to conflict-
affected countries. Paluck and Green 2009 studied the effect of a radio programme in post-
genocide Rwanda on social norms and attitudes, by investigating the role of the media as an 
agent of social change in post-conflict societies. The results showed limited effects on many 
measures of pro-social beliefs and attitudes, but a positive effect on individual willingness to 
express dissent and on forms of collective action to solve communal problems. Blattman, 
Hartman and Blair (2014) studied the effect of a mass education campaign in Liberia on 
informal practices and norms that shape the resolution of local disputes. They found that, a 
year after the campaign, towns where the mass education programme had taken place 
benefited from higher levels of resolution of land disputes and lower levels of violence than 
towns where the programme was not implemented. The authors concluded that such forms 
of mass education can potentially improve informal bargaining processes when formal 
governance is weak. 
                                               
7  This literature is reviewed in Bauer et al. (2016). 
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4  Lessons and ways forward 
The main aim of this paper was to review an emerging body of literature on the design and 
evaluation of current or recent governance interventions in weak states experiencing 
ongoing conflict or at risk of conflict and violence. The paper started by proposing a 
conceptual analysis of the relationship between governance, fragility and conflict, which 
highlighted three features of conflict-affected contexts that may affect the implementation of 
successful governance interventions. These are: the relationship between elites and other 
social groups; the importance of the local level; and the interaction (often tense) between 
formal and informal institutions. The second part of the paper reviewed existing and ongoing 
governance interventions in conflict-affected contexts, with the aim of identifying what 
aspects of governance interventions may or may not work in countries experiencing violent 
conflict or at risk of conflict, and the challenges of conducting governance interventions in 
such contexts. The next section summarises the main findings, while Section 4.2 proposes 
ways forward for future research and policy interventions in conflict-affected contexts.  
 
4.1 Summary and conclusions  
The review conducted in the paper showed that there is a scarcity of evidence on which 
governance reforms may work to reduce violence and conflict. Although a great deal of 
progress has been achieved in addressing the challenges of governing countries either 
experiencing ongoing violent conflict, recovering from conflict or at serious risk of conflict, 
there is still much we do not understand about such complex processes. In addition, 
estimated effects on inclusiveness, social cohesion and security outcomes are to date mixed 
and appear highly sensitive to the design of the intervention and the context in which it is 
implemented. We summarise the main findings of the review below. 
 
The local level, decentralisation and collective action. The fragmented nature of 
authority in conflict-affected countries has led to a policy emphasis on the need to build 
democracy, institutions and governance from the bottom up. CDD programmes have 
become a popular form of intervention in these contexts, where development projects and 
aid are provided alongside localised training on participatory democracy. Section 3 reviewed 
how these interventions have addressed their two main objectives of strengthening social 
cohesion and local governance, and broadening the political representation of marginalised 
groups. The (limited) existing evidence is mixed. Generally, CDD programmes have had 
limited effect on social cohesion, local capacity for collective action or social inclusiveness. 
In some instances, some interventions have been associated with rises in conflict. 
Interventions implemented to strengthen the role of traditional authorities appear to have 
been more successful but rigorous evidence is still very limited.  
 
Some reasons may explain these mixed results. The logic underlying CDD programmes and 
their efforts to build democratic governance from the bottom up is based on the premise that 
more participation and more inclusive decision-making processes will improve social 
cohesion, trust and cooperation. However, areas where violence is prevalent may follow a 
very different logic. First, almost all governance interventions in conflict-affected countries in 
the form of CDD programmes do not take into account the particular institutional features of 
these settings, notably the fact that violence is often a component of governance (Justino 
2016). Even in cases that appear more stable and thus more prone to successful CDD 
programmes, violent norms of governance may persist as different political actors compete 
for political control and power. There is, therefore, a risk that external interventions (in the 
form of CDD programmes or other forms of international aid) may perpetuate such 
processes when they fail to acknowledge how the intervention may affect local political 
processes of authority, control and competition during or in the aftermath of violent conflicts.  
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Second, power-sharing, participatory decision-making and inclusiveness – values that shape 
CDD programmes and other forms of local external governance interventions – may not 
necessarily result in stability and social cohesion, particularly in deeply divided societies 
during and after violent conflicts. Often, disputes arise over the terms of inclusiveness and 
power-sharing (Barron et al. 2011). It is, therefore, important that policy interventions in 
these settings take more explicit consideration of their distributive effects and are aware of 
who benefits from interventions which are themselves shaped by local social and political 
processes of institutional change. Understanding how interventions may affect specific forms 
of de jure and de facto political power are particularly useful in these contexts. These two 
points will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2 below. 
 
Accountability, legitimacy and the reach of state institutions. There has been strong 
pressure to strengthen the accountability, legitimacy and reach of state institutions in 
conflict-affected countries as a form of improving how governance institutions maintain 
peace and stability in the post-conflict period. The most popular form of intervention to date 
to improve accountability and legitimacy has been the use of information campaigns. Some 
results suggest that an increase in transparency about politicians’ performance through 
mass education and information campaigns may be a powerful mechanism to improve 
accountability and legitimacy. However, other studies have shown that some of these tools 
can have adverse effects on voter turnout, possibly because information flows interact with 
different institutional set-ups in ways that still remain under-researched and ill-understood. 
There is, therefore, an urgent need for more work on how information can increase 
democratic participation and make democracy work, particularly in countries experiencing or 
at risk of experiencing violent conflict.  
 
Other recent governance interventions have attempted to strengthen the reach of state 
institutions through improving the provision of public goods and services. These have had 
positive results overall. Findings from a growing body of evidence show that cash transfer 
programmes, government welfare expenditures and government investments in 
infrastructure may be useful tools to improve the social contract and avoid (or at least 
mitigate or reduce) violence and conflict. Effects on security reform interventions are less 
clear but interventions that have improved relations between the state police and 
communities have yielded better results than more traditional reforms linked to DDR 
programmes. These results stand in contrast with the more negative findings of evaluations 
of CDD programmes discussed above. At the moment, it is difficult to identify the reasons for 
these contrasting results given the limited number of studies on both types of interventions. 
However, it is possible that this may reflect a difference between internally and externally 
driven forms of reform, an issue addressed in more detail in the next section. 
 
Social rules and norms. A small body of literature has examined how changes in 
institutions and governance may be done in ways that affect norms of behaviour, such as 
altruism, reciprocity and social cooperation. Most of this literature has focused on peaceful 
settings. Some examples of successful interventions in conflict-affected settings include the 
use of media to improve social cooperation in Rwanda and the design of education 
campaigns to improve local mechanisms of conflict resolution in Liberia. This is a very 
promising area of research and policy intervention because reducing the risk of conflict and 
violence depends not only on institutional design (more democratic processes of decision-
making, more effective provision of public goods, and so forth) but also on how social norms 
around pro-social behaviour and attitudes towards violence evolve and change.  
 
4.2 Way forward for future research 
Overall, existing evidence on the effectiveness of governance interventions shows mixed 
results. These mixed results are, to a large extent, a reflection of the fact that governance 
interventions (and evaluations of such) in countries experiencing or at risk of experiencing 
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conflict have been few and far between. There is, in particular, a need for more empirical 
and theoretical work to identify the conditions under which the introduction of new 
governance institutions might be effective and ultimately improve development and peace 
outcomes.  
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, recent studies on how to improve the effectiveness of 
governance interventions in fragile and conflict-affected countries allow us to draw a number 
of important lessons for future governance agendas focused on ensuring more sustainable 
state-building and peace processes. The first is the clear need to better understand the 
political dynamics of conflict-affected countries, as most such governance interventions are 
rarely embedded in the political contexts in which they are implemented. The second lesson 
is related to emerging findings on the importance of internally driven governance reforms. 
Thirdly, the analysis presented in this paper suggests important trade-offs among the 
intended outcomes of governance interventions. In particular, there is a great need to better 
understand the distributional consequences of governance interventions. Finally, both 
Sections 2 and 3 discussed the importance of the local level given the fragmentation of 
authority that characterises countries. As a result, governance interventions in such contexts 
have largely focused on an implicit push for decentralisation of decision-making processes 
and building ‘good governance’ and ‘good (or good enough) institutions’ from the bottom up. 
While that approach has undoubtedly allowed new interventions and original policy solutions 
in areas of weak state presence, the analysis conducted in this paper also suggests the 
need for a closer look at multi-level approaches to governance in countries at risk of conflict. 
These four lessons are discussed in more detail below, alongside suggestions for future 
research.  
 
4.2.1 Understanding the political dynamics of conflict-affected countries 
Section 2 made the important point that managing violence – i.e. avoiding violence 
becoming an integral part of governance structures – is a central challenge to governance 
interventions in countries experiencing conflict or at risk of violent conflict. But as is clear 
from the review conducted in Section 3, one critical weakness of existing governance 
interventions in fragile and conflict-affected countries is that they are often disconnected 
from the political contexts in which they are implemented (see Mansuri and Rao 2012). 
However, it is important to recognise that governance interventions are not designed in an 
institutional vacuum, despite ongoing or recently ended conflict. In fact, governance often 
emerges from conflict: ‘Today’s governance is the child of yesterday’s violence… Even the 
countries that enjoy the highest per capita incomes and most peaceful societies in the world, 
such as most of Europe, emerged from wars and violent contests for power…’ (World Bank 
2017: 112). This is because conflicts and wars give rise to important ‘wartime institutions’ 
and forms of ‘wartime governance’ (Justino 2016) that tend to persist and shape how 
institutions and forms of governance emerge and evolve in the aftermath of the conflict.  
 
But while the literature has largely focused on how governance interventions may be able to 
affect ongoing violence or the future prospect of violence, much less attention has been paid 
to the fact that conflict or the risk of conflict may affect the success, effectiveness and 
feasibility of such interventions. There is also an implicit and erroneous assumption that 
conflict-affected areas are anarchic, disordered and ungoverned – and therefore ripe for 
‘better’ forms of governance in the post-conflict period. This could not be further from reality.  
 
Although conflict-affected countries tend to be defined as ‘collapsed’ or ‘failed’ states, in 
reality, the breakdown of governments does not necessarily lead to the end of ‘governance’ 
(Menkhaus 2007; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot 2008). Often it is accompanied 
by institutional changes as different political actors gain the monopoly over the use of 
violence in contested areas and become the de facto authority. These endogenous 
dynamics of conflict and governance have considerable consequences for the outcomes of 
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governance interventions in the post-conflict period by shaping the institutional and relational 
settings under which such interventions are implemented (Justino 2016) – as was the case 
in the Philippines (Crost et al. 2014). A better understanding of these complex political 
constellations that dominated conflict areas well beyond the end of the conflict is of key 
importance for the success of future governance interventions. In particular, it would help us 
to better understand points of pressure and breakdown that may re-ignite local tensions and 
violence, as well as points of resilience and opportunities to prevent future violent outbreaks 
such as, for instance, local pockets of peace and reform within conflict zones, or social 
movements and organisations seeking less violent pathways to change in conflict contexts. 
 
4.2.2 The importance of internally driven governance reforms 
As discussed above, CDD interventions have become very popular based on the premise 
that accountability and inclusiveness of local governance institutions are key determinants of 
economic performance and reduced conflict risk in countries where authority is fragmented 
and contested. There is also an implicit assumption that local ‘good’ governance practices 
over the course of a few years can alter social behaviour in the longer term in ways that will 
scale up to the national level. As a result, many international aid agencies are now heavily 
involved in attempts to strengthen civil society and build local governance in the hope that 
these measures will increase local accountability and public good provision. These 
interventions have become very popular despite concerns with the appropriateness of 
governance reform and democracy promotion in contexts of widespread poverty, or the 
scepticism with which elites and ordinary citizens in conflict-affected countries may perceive 
externally driven interventions to promote ‘good governance’ and Western-style democratic 
structures (Paris 2004). However, there is no clear evidence that these local interventions 
have been successfully able to build new institutions of governance, improve the 
accountability of existing ones or effectively change social cohesion and patterns of 
cooperation.  
 
These findings stand in contrast with the effects of cash transfer programmes and 
government welfare expenditures. The review showed that interventions to improve the 
provision of public goods and services by governments have generally been associated with 
reduced conflict and violence. One possible explanation for these contrasting results may lie 
in the fact that government expenditures reflect a clear social contract between governments 
and citizens, while externally imposed governance interventions may be implemented 
without affecting this relationship. This would suggest that government-led public goods 
provision programmes may have an important role to play in reducing or mitigating violent 
conflict. However, this argument needs to be balanced against the fact that government 
expenditures may indeed ‘buy peace’ but the cost may be corruption and harmful forms of 
clientelism, which may generate conflict and violence in the face of external shocks or 
budgetary constraints when expenditures are not linked to political reform (World Bank 
2017). Some scholars have argued that this may have been the case in Syria and more 
widely across countries affected by the ‘Arab Spring’ events, where large government 
programmes in contexts of state autocracy eventually failed to address the expectations of 
the population at large (see Devarajan and Ianchovichina 2017; Justino and Martorano 
2016c).  
 
However, the central role of government expenditure in preventing or mitigating violence is 
further supported by additional evidence from a number of studies that have examined the 
impact of government infrastructure investments on violence. These are intriguing results, 
suggesting that it might be ineffective to impose institutions externally in contexts where 
informal institutions and uneven power structures prevail. Therefore, greater consideration 
must be given in future research and policy to reforms enacted internally by the governments 
that are devoted to mandate a change in the distribution of de facto and de jure power and 
how these may affect the social contract between citizens and the state, as well as relations 
27 
 
of cooperation and trust between different social groups. This finding also emphasises the 
need for much greater knowledge about how to increase the revenue-raising capacity of 
weak states at risk of conflict in ways that may promote more sustainable forms of state-
building that do not require externally imposed institutional designs.  
 
4.2.3 Understanding the distributional consequences of governance reforms in 
countries at risk of conflict 
Despite the recent focus on the importance of inclusive governance structures, the review in 
Section 3 suggests that it is not clear that political inclusivity is always necessarily 
associated with political stability (see also Cederman et al. 2010, 2013). This is illustrated by 
the mixed evidence on the effect of governance interventions aimed at improving 
participatory decision-making, power-sharing between different social groups and the 
inclusiveness of marginal groups. The reality is that social tensions and sometimes violence 
often emerge as a result of competition between different social groups and political actors 
over the terms of inclusivity of different interventions, particularly in settings where public 
authority is not fully consolidated at the centre. However, research has yet to examine who 
benefits from governance interventions that are designed and implemented in particular 
ways and in specific institutional settings.  
 
As discussed in Section 2, a recent body of research has argued that the emergence of 
inclusive and democratic societies is largely explained by how institutions manage social 
diversity and different interests at historical transition points (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; 
Boix 2003; North et al. 2009). Distributional differences affect not only how state institutions 
function, but also how local self-governing institutions deliver local public goods. Notably, 
high levels of distributive conflicts may lead to local institutional failures when resources and 
power are captured – or perceived to be captured (see Barron et al. 2011) – by elites or 
interest groups at the expense of other sections of the population (Bardhan 2005; Ostrom 
1990; Platteau 2004). These distributional considerations are important because governance 
interventions, and the institutional frameworks that result from them, produce winners and 
losers that may themselves shape how systems of governance will operate in the future, and 
for whom. A key mechanism, as discussed above, is related to how resources are mobilised 
and distributed through systems of formal and informal taxation – a topic that has received 
very limited attention in the literature but should be at the centre of future research and 
policy interventions on governance systems in conflict-affected settings. Another mechanism 
may be related to changes in social norms and attitudes towards violence, cooperation, 
reciprocity and trust – an issue that needs urgent attention in the literature and in the design 
of policies aimed at improving the governance of countries experiencing or at risk of 
experiencing violent conflict, in ways that promote more sustainable and inclusive state-
building and peace processes. 
 
4.2.4 A multi-level approach to governance in countries at risk of conflict 
One final point relates to the geographical level at which governance interventions take 
place. A large proportion of (even if not all) recent and ongoing governance interventions in 
conflict settings have taken place at the community level. In many cases this is the natural 
unit of intervention from which we can gather important information on micro-level 
foundations of governance in contexts where public authority is contested and fragmented. 
However, this unit of intervention may restrict the possibility of scaled-up interventions that 
may effectively shape state governance structures. Despite the impressive advances 
brought by the emerging literature on governance reviewed above, we still have only limited 
knowledge or evidence on the complex processes that link the multitude of power 
arrangements at the local level with national-level governance systems.  
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In moving forward, there is a need to develop new multi-level analytical perspectives on how 
interventions to strengthen governance systems in weak states are designed and 
implemented. This involves a more detailed knowledge on: (1) how governance systems and 
power-sharing arrangements that emerge at the local level may reinforce violent and non-
violent, or inclusive and non-inclusive, institutions of governance at the national level; (2) how 
different arrangements and institutions of governance at the national level may result in 
different security, political and development outcomes for local communities; and (3) how 
international factors may affect power configurations at the local and national levels (Balcells 
and Justino 2014). A better understanding of these complex links between the ‘local’ and the 
‘national’ is likely to offer important entry points at the levels of actors, processes and 
locations when interventions may be able to promote peace and sustainable state-building 
and development processes in countries at risk of conflict and violence. 
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